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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
prove this. Assuming, without deciding, that the chattel mortgage
would be enforceable in Missouri, the court cut directly to the
question of burden of proof. Without the benefit of any authori-
ties,9 the court reached the logical and reasonable conclusion that
"since plaintiff is seeking to have Louisiana recognize and enforce
an unrecorded foreign chattel mortgage against an innocent pur-
chaser of the automobile, a plain duty rested upon it to prove
that it was without knowledge that the car had been brought to
Louisiana as it is only in such circumstances that it can be excused
for its failure to comply with our laws of registry."1 0
There still appears to linger the tendency to call it a "rule
of comity"'1 when a claim asserted to have originated under the
laws of another state (or foreign country) is recognized in the
forum. It is submitted that designating the governing precept as
the appropriate "Louisiana rule of conflict of laws" would be
more specific. Whereas comity looks only to a recognition through
courtesy, a rule of conflict of laws would have the advantage of
a concrete assertion which can operate not only towards an
affirmative protection to an asserted claim but also towards a
negative denial. At the same time, it offers more stability and
predictability than the constantly shifting sands of the pure dis-
cretion or courtesy implied in the idea of comity. In the absence
of comprehensive legislative coverage, it is within the authority
and responsibility of the court to develop and formulate these
Louisiana rules of conflict of laws.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The number of cases wherein the court is called upon to
adjust the differences between the parties to contracts to sell
real estate has apparently not fallen off despite the fact that the
course of decision has of late been particularly clear. Four such
cases were presented during the last term.
9. This specific question of burden of proof does not seem to have given
much cause for concern because it is not mentioned in the usual conflict of
laws references. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 396-399 (2 ed. 1951);
Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws 486-488 (3 ed. 1949); Jones, Chat-
tel Mortgages and Conditional Sales; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 266,
268, 275; 68 A.L.R. 554, 87 A.L.R. 1298, 148 A.L.R. 375.
10. 59 So. 2d 108, 110.
11. 59 So. 2d 108, 109.
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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In Hoth v. Schmidt' the court reaffirmed its position that in
a contract to sell real estate the time fixed for the passage of the
act of sale is of the essence. The purchaser was suing for a return
of double the deposit. The seller had made overtures to the buyer
designed to buy off the contract, and it was while these negotia-
tions were pending that the time stipulated in the contract to sell
expired. The court pointed to a contract provision giving the
vendor the right to declare the deposit forfeited without placing
the purchaser in default "in the event the purchaser fails" to
comply with the agreement within the time specified. And the
court observed that it was only where "the vendor refuses to com-
ply with the agreement within the time specified" that the pur-
chaser had the right to claim the return of double the deposit.
It was also found that there had been neither an extension of
time in writing nor a putting in default by the buyer.
A similar holding was made in Harell v. Stumberg,2 where
the court further added that an extension of time cannot be estab-
lished by estoppel.
Another such case was Kenney v. Wedderin.3 Here the con-
tract to sell allowed the purchaser fifteen days from the date of
acceptance to secure a homestead loan. The court said that the
provision for the loan was for the benefit of the buyer but that
the time limit was for the benefit of the seller. It refused to
enforce the agreement notwithstanding the fact that the buyer
had tried frantically to get the loan and actually had succeeded
the day after the period expired.
A related problem was presented in Fox v. Doll,4 where a
purchaser recovered double the amount deposited. Here no time
for the conveyance was fixed in the contract. The seller had not
removed a paving lien, and the purchaser refused to go through
with the contract after the lapse of a two and a half months
period. The evidence showed that the purchaser persisted in his
refusal even after the vendor agreed to cancel the lien.
To say that the Hoth case was a hard one for the buyer is
only to point up the obvious. He was the one who within the
time allowed had insisted upon going, through with the sale
while the vendor wanted to get out. Indeed, the petition showed
1. 220 La. 249, 56 So. 2d 412 (1951).
2. 220 La. 811, 57 So. 2d 692 (1952).
3. 220 La. 285, 56 So. 2d 550 (1951).
4. 221 La. 427, 59 So. 2d 443 (1952).
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that it was the vendor's efforts to cancel that brought about the
delay that defeated the purchaser. The result of the court's
holding was that the vendor not only secured his release without
having to pay for it as he had been offering to do, but he also
retained the deposit put up by the purchaser. In the Harrell case,
the court seemed to find that a thirty-day period for the passage
of title was twice fixed in the contract and that this clearly
showed time to be of the essence. An examination of the con-
tract indicates that two different thirty-day periods were involved,
one during which the offer would remain open for acceptance
and the other for the passage of the act of sale after the contract
to sell had been completed by acceptance. It is interesting to
notice that the vendor gave the real estate broker a ninety-day
listing and the broker found the plaintiff purchaser within a few
days after the listing was given. If a thirty-day period was of so
much concern to the vendor, one may wonder why he was willing
to list his property for ninety days with the real estate broker.
It is not clear why in contracts to sell real estate the time
for the conveyance is considered so important in Louisiana when
it is not so treated elsewhere.5 Even if a party who fails to per-
form on time is automatically in default when time is of the
essence, the express language of Article 2047 of the Louisiana
Civil Code shows that the power of the court to grant further
time to the "party in default" is not cut off. And granting that
the parties may effectively provide to the contrary, the fixing of
a time for performance plus a general provision that time is of
the essence is ordinarily not considered sufficient to deprive the
court of the power to enforce the contract, notwithstanding
default.
Adverting to the court's finding in the Hoth case that there
was no extension of time in writing, it is to be observed that the
plaintiff was not relying on a claimed agreement to extend time,
where a question of form might arise, but was asking the court
to adjust the rights of the parties in keeping with its authority
under Article 2047. The holding in the Harrell case that an exten-
sion of time cannot be established by estoppel seems likewise to
be based on the same questionable notion that only the parties
can allow further time for performance and that the court has no
authority to do so unless there is a basis for finding an estoppel.
This, again, seems to overlook the fact that the code expressly
5. 5 Corbin on Contracts 780, § 1177; 3 id. at 805, § 716 (1951).
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authorizes the court to grant further time for performance to the
party in default.
The judgment in the Fox case giving the plaintiff a return of
double the earnest money deposited was, in effect, a judgment of
resolution with damages0 Under Article 2047 of the code, when
the court is presented with a demand for resolution it may allow
the defendant further time for performance. Therefore the ques-
tion was whether the court should allow the vendor further time
for performance or whether it should dissolve the contract. Judi-
cial resolution of this kind of problem calls for a determination
of just how vitally important the time element is under the facts
and circumstances of the case, how serious the delay has been,
whether the party in default was in good or bad faith, and
whether the contract, despite the delay, can be enforced substan-
tially as written. This was the approach of the court in Southport
Mills v. Ansley.7
One might wish that the court had dealt at greater length
with the problem it had before it in Corona v. Corona.8 Plaintiff,
who had sold his interest in certain realty and a poultry business
conducted thereon, brought an action of lesion beyond moiety.
His suit was dismissed on the ground that the action of lesion
does not apply to a sale of movables and immovables combined.
In support the court referred to Louisiana Civil Code Articles
1861 and 2594. It appears, however, that under Article 2666, if,
say, A transfers to B immovable property worth $100 and mov-
able property worth $1,501 and receives in return immovable
property worth $1,000, A, the transferor of the movable and im-
movable property, may claim lesion beyond moiety. If this be
true, then the question that naturally arises is what difference
it should make if instead of receiving in return an immovable
worth $1,000, A received $1,000 in cash? Article 2666 indicates
that A's claim of lesion is supported by the fact that he is the
transferor of an immovable and it does not deny relief to him
because he also transfers as part of the transaction movable
property.
It was particularly interesting to find that in Martin-Parry
6. See 11 Beudant, Cours de Droit Civil 261 (1938): "La remise des arrhes
est F'indice que les parties ont entendu se rdserver l'une et Z'autre le droit de
se dddire; il y a facultd de r~siliation avec r6glement anticipd des dommages-
intr6ts."
7. 160 La. 131, 106 So. 720 (1926).
8. 221 La. 576, 59 So. 2d 889 (1952).
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Corporation v. New Orleans Fire Detection Service9 the court
took advantage of an opportunity to say a further word concern-
ing potestative conditions and the enforceability of agreements of
noncompetition, and certain earlier cases dealing therewith,
notably Blanchard v. Haber.'0 There it was held that an agree-
ment of noncompetition was unenforceable because it was con-
tracted "under a potestative condition." The case shows that Dr.
Haber gave his promise of noncompetition in return for Dr.
Blanchard's promise of employment. If he was willing to do so,
notwithstanding that the employment could be terminated by
Dr. Blanchard on thirty days' notice, he was also free to do so
short of running afoul of an overriding public policy. Actually
the latter is believed to have been the true basis of the decision.
All contracts of noncompetition are inimical to the best interest
of the public, which, at least up to a point, will profit from an
absence of restrictions on competition. Certainly would this be
true .with reference to professional people like dentists. On the
other hand, an employer or vendee is entitled to some protection
against the possibility of subsequent competition by those whom
he employs or from whom he buys, and as long as the restraint
imposed is reasonably necessary to give the needed protection,
and no more, the courts should uphold such agreements in the
absence of legislation requiring the contrary. Where the restraint
is unreasonable, agreements of noncompetition are unenforce-
able. In the instant case the obligation of a branch manager not
to entice or disturb his employer's dealers or other employees
for a period of two years following the termination of his employ-
ment, was reasonable in substance and in duration. It was ad-
judged enforceable. Let us hope that the present opinion will
tend to divorce cases of this kind from the potestative condition
confusion.
A considerable portion of the time that the court was called
upon to give to problems involving the law relating to conven-
tional obligations was taken up by matters of no real jurispru-
dential consequence. It had to consider whether a cost-plus con-
tractor was entitled to the balance he claimed under a building
contract;" whether an employee was compelled to leave his em-
ployment because of the wrongful conduct of his employer so that
he would be entitled to his unpaid salary for the remainder of
9. 60 So. 2d 83 (La. 1952).
10. 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928).
11. Lagasse v. Allen, 219 La. 745, 54 So. 2d 6 (1951).
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the contract period under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2749;12 it
had to repeat again that parol evidence is not admissible to prove
that what purports to be a sale for cash in hand paid is in fact a
donation; 13 it was called upon to enforce a contract written so as
to preserve a landowner's claim of prescription liberandi causa
against the contention that the right had been lost through the
signing of a unitization contract; 1 4 it had to deal with the trouble-
some problem of property valuation in disposing of a claim of
lesion beyond moiety;15 it affirmed the dismissal of a suit for
demurrage charges and taxes, finding that the defendant who
loaded certain railroad cars did not have dominion over them;' 6
it applied the parol evidence rule in an action for specific per-
formance of an agreement to convey an interest in a plantation
so as to exclude any evidence beyond a writing binding, appar-
ently, on the plaintiff; 7 it found that a teacher had not accepted
a tendered appointment so as to make available under the Teacher
Tenure Act the writ of mandamus for securing reinstatement; 8
and it had to consider whether a plaintiff had proved an alleged
three-year contract for the removal of dirt. 19
One thing should be noted concerning the opinion in the last-
mentioned case. Counsel for plaintiff urged upon the court Section
90 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of Contracts,
which embodies a principle commonly known as the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. In response, the court replied that the cited
theory is unknown to our law. Some of the cases from common
law jurisdictions demonstrate misapplications of Section 90 suffi-
ciently flagrant to have given the draftsman of that section cause
to doubt the wisdom of its inclusion or the choice of language it
contains. It is heartening that our court is not willing to succumb
to its wiles.
The influence upon us of the common law doctrine of consid-
eration is observable in an opinion of the court dealing with the
right of an attorney to recover on a claim for professional serv-
ices rendered after he had secured the certification of a check sent
12. Carlson v. Ewing, 219 La. 961, 54 So. 2d 414 (1951).
13. Lewis v. Clay, 60 So. 2d 78 (La. 1952).
14. Placid Oil Co. v. George, 221 La. 200, 59 So. 2d 120 (1952).
15. Lakeside Dairies, Inc. v. Gregersen, 221 La. 503, 59 So. 2d 701 (1952).
16. Texas & P. Ry. v. Great Nat. Oil Corp. of La., 221 La. 378, 59 So. 2d
426 (1952).
17. Stack v. De Soto Properties, Inc., 221 La. 384, 59 So. 2d 428 (1952).
18. State ex rel. Eberle v. Orleans Parish School Board, 221 La. 243, 59
So. 2d 177 (1952).
19. Ducote v. Oden, 221 La. 228, 59 So. 2d 130 (1952).
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to him in full settlement of his feeY0 To a common law court, the
problem would involve the doctrine of consideration, and its
resolution would turn on whether or not the amount due was in
dispute. On finding that a dispute did exist the common law court
would take the view that the creditor's acceptance of the amount
tendered was supported by consideration and therefore an accord
and satisfaction had occurred. Our court, not without precedent
in our law, however, handled the problem in the same way.
Actually, with us facts of the kind in question raise a prob-
lem of remission. A gratuitous remission is perfectly valid under
our code. To find a remission of the remainder when part pay-
ment is made there should be found an intention to remit or the
creditor should be held estopped by his acceptance of the amount
paid to deny the existence of such intention. The facts show that
the attorney's fee was to be based on the value of certain stock.
No dispute at all had developed before the client sent the check
in question, the amount of which was figured on an arbitrary
value fixed by himself. The attorney kept the check but claimed
with strong support in the facts that the value used by the
client was not the true value of the stock. By the letter he wrote
to his client upon receiving the check, the attorney definitely
negated any intention to remit. There was thus no actual inten-
tion to remit; and it is by no means clear that we should permit
a debtor to claim an estoppel against a creditor who accepts a
payment admittedly due, for it will be remembered that the law





Louisiana's general receivership statute provides for the
judicial appointment of receivers at the instance of minority
shareholders whose interests are "in imminent danger" from gross
mismanagement, persistent ultra vires action or wasting of the
corporate assets.' The corporate receivership, however, is an
expensive and rather drastic remedy, and it may not be resorted
20. Henriques v. Vaccaro, 220 La. 216, 56 So. 2d 236 (1951).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. R.S. 1950, 12:752(2), (11).
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